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Abstract  
How latecomers from emerging countries catch up on technological innovation is an important 
topic for industrial practitioners, policymakers, and academic researchers. This study 
systematically reviews 43 empirical studies on the precursors of industry catch-up in emerging 
countries. A general framework on what makes a successful catch-up in latecomer industries is 
suggested based on literature review. The framework comprises six generic determinants, 
including technological capability, business ecosystem, government roles, market condition, 
technological regime, and windows of opportunity. In addition, this framework is applied to 








What determines catch-up outcomes in emerging economies is a long standing question in the 
innovation field. Given the importance of catch-up for latecomer economies, substantial 
research was launched and yielded many thought-provoking achievements. With highly diverse 
research foci, previous works highlighted several factors, such as the roles of government 
(Sung and Hong, 1999; Mu and Lee, 2005; He et al., 2006; Hu and Hsu, 2008; Whang and 
Hobday, 2011; Choung et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2015; Kiamehr et al., 2015), 
the effort of latecomers’ technology capability building (Sung and Hong, 1999; Lee and Lim, 
2001; Mu and Lee, 2005; Hu and Hsu, 2008; Li et al., 2010; Park, 2012; Chuang and Hobday, 
2013; Lee et al., 2014; Chen and Chen, 2015; Hu et al., 2015), the favorable market conditions 
(Mu and Lee, 2005; Li et al., 2010; Whang and Hobday, 2011; Hwang and Choung, 2014; 
Kiamehr et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015), the influence of technological regime (Mu and Lee, 
2005; Whang and Hobday, 2011; Chen and Chen, 2015; Hu et al., 2015), the support of the 
local business ecosystem (He et al., 2006; Hu and Hsu, 2008; Li, 2008; Li and Kozhikode, 
2008; Whang and Hobday, 2011; Park, 2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Chen and 
Chen, 2015; Liu et al., 2015), and the utilization of windows of opportunity (Li and Kozhikode, 
2008; Whang and Hobday, 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2015). 
Despite providing an informative understanding of the determinants of catch-up, extant 
studies may have two potential gaps. First, prior literature predominantly focused on catch-up 
processes in a specific industry sector and discussed a set of limited and industry-specific 
determinants. Hence, their findings may not be generalizable in analyzing catch-up in other 
industries. Second, identified factors are somewhat confused at the analyzing levels. For 
example, certain firm- or national-level factors are mixed with industrial factors. In short, the 
catch-up factors identified in prior studies did not fall into proper categories and were not yet 
integrated in a coherent framework.  
Thus, we attempt to fill in these gaps in the present study. We conduct this research using 
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the case study method and propose a general analytical framework to identify what determines 
a successful catch-up for latecomers. Specifically, we first review and summarize various 
driving factors in the existing studies to form a general framework for analyzing the catch-up 
process across different industries. We then apply our proposed framework to the LED industry 
for validating our framework. 
We are motivated by three questions for choosing China’s LED industry as our case 
subject. First, this industry has a complex value chain with various participants so that almost 
all driving forces of catch-up can be tested. As such, the LED industry provides an ideal context 
for us to validate our comprehensive framework. Second, China’s LED industry may realize 
catch-up in terms of market and technology development. Furthermore, this industry has a 
relatively comprehensive and internationally competitive industry value chain in the past 
decade. Therefore, the catch-up process of China’s LED industry is compatible with the aim of 
the present study. Third, China’s LED industry is growing, with many interesting 
characteristics in the catch-up process, but it receives limited attention from scholars. People 
commonly assume that the leaders of such a technological-intensive industry should be firms 
from developed countries. This assumption may be true in terms of “technological capabilities.” 
However, Asia is catching up with the western leaders in terms of market shares (Lee and Lim, 
2001). In fact, Asia is not only an early adopter of LED, but it also leads the global LED market. 
According to a lighting report from McKinsey (2012), Asia remains the largest general lighting 
market which accounts for 24% of the total market share in 2011; by contrast, Europe and 
North America only represent 15% and 16% of the total market share, respectively. In other 
words, latecomers in Asia significantly realize market share catch-up, even though they still 
have a long way to go for technology catch-up. However, such an industrial catch-up pattern 
already challenges the traditional thinking about the catch-up process and thus calls for further 
studies to explain the underlying logic behind this predicament.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we will introduce the 
general framework of driving factors for the catch-up process, including the six dimensions of 
government role, technology capability, market condition, technological regime, business 
ecosystem, and windows of opportunity. In Section 3, we will present the case of Chinese LED 
industry to validate our framework. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss our main findings and 
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conclusions as well as the study’s policy implications. 
 
2 The general framework 
2.1 Research method 
 
To summarize the common driving forces of catch-up, we used the ISI Web of Science to select 
relevant articles from the literature. This database provides bibliographic information for over 
12,000 academic journals and covers the mainstream journals in the social sciences. 
Specifically, we performed data collection in the following four steps. 
First, we performed a search using the keywords “catch-up” and “latecomer,” by which 
we obtained 64 articles. Second, two researchers simultaneously read all these articles to 
validate if they discuss the factors determining catch-up. We then categorized the key 
arguments of the selected studies and identified six dimensions, namely, government role, 
market condition, technological regime, technology capability, business ecosystem, and 
windows of opportunity. Third, we expanded and complemented the first round of article 
collection with a second review of articles in the ISI Web of Science. As catch-up and latecomer 
may describe a similar phenomenon, we combined each of the keywords “catch-up” and 
“latecomer,” with each of the identified six dimensions summarized in the second step. We 
obtained another 60 articles. After deleting repetitive articles, 115 articles remained. To obtain 
the most relevant articles, two researchers rechecked the remaining articles and identified the 
ones that should be deeply analyzed for the present study. Specifically, we retained articles that 
discuss catch-up phenomena of industries and firms in latecomer economies. In case of 
disagreement between the two researchers in article categorization, a third expert specializing 
in innovation management would join in the group discussion. Finally, we identified 43 articles 
for our case study. The main arguments of the 43 articles are listed in Table 1. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
After data collection, two researchers analyzed and summarized every article separately. 
They then cross-checked each other’s analysis. First, each researcher read the first article in the 
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list of the 43 articles. Second, each researcher extracted the main arguments about the 
determinants of focal catch-up phenomenon. Third, each researcher disintegrated those 
arguments into phrases representing the determinants of the catch-up phenomenon. Fourth, 
each researcher clustered all phrases into formal concepts according to the theoretical meaning 
and relationships among all phrases. Fifth, the other two experts examined the clustering 
processes and, if necessary, integrated those formal concepts identified in the previous step into 
general concepts. Lastly, all researchers discussed how to establish a framework using the 
formal concepts identified in the previous step. Subsequently, each of the remaining articles 
was analyzed by following the aforementioned steps. The original framework will be updated 
by supplementing new information extracted from the remaining articles. Through an iterative 
process of reading articles, summarizing constructs, forming analytical framework, returning 
to the articles to check for inconsistencies, and emerging with refreshed constructs and an 
analytical framework, we finally came to a general framework of industry-level catch-up, 
which is described in Fig. 1. Table 2 reports the summarization of the percentages and 
representative arguments of each determinant in the 43 articles. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In this study, industry-level catch-up refers to the phenomenon wherein firms in the focal 
industry averagely show an obvious trend of reducing the gaps between themselves and the 
leading firms in terms of technological or market performance. Therefore, industry-level catch-
up can be rooted in the interplays of firms’ internal (e.g., research and development (R&D) 
investment) and external factors (e.g., favorable policies of the government). In our framework, 
the catch-up process in an industry is directly determined by agent factors, including industry 
players’ technology capability and business ecosystem. Latecomers’ technology capabilities 
are endogenous in nature. In other words, these capabilities are developed or originated within 
those firms. While business ecosystem represents an exogenous capability accessible to 
latecomers, latecomers can obtain support from other partners within the same business 
ecosystem. In addition, if the industry encounters a favorable context, strong support from 
government, favorable market condition, munificence of technological regime, and good 
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windows of opportunity of core technology development, then the catch-up process of the 
industry will be efficient and successful. However, as the saying goes, “To forge iron, the body 
must itself be strong.” Contextual factors help firms survive and compete with their foreign 
rivals. However, a firm with undeveloped technology capability is likely to fail in the long run. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert fig. 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.2 Technological capability 
 
Schumpeterian economists argue that innovation and technological capabilities are important 
driving forces for catch-up (Lee et al., 2014). The accumulation of technological capabilities 
gradually overweighs traditional physical capital and becomes the fundamental factor for 
catch-up (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007). In our framework, a firm’s technological capability 
mainly consists of absorptive capacity and the strategy of technological learning. 
If firms had sufficient absorptive capacity, then they would tend to understand and grasp 
the external advanced technology. However, a firm’s absorptive capacity depends on its prior 
knowledge base (Sung and Hong, 1999; Hu et al., 2015) and the existing knowledge base 
(Chuang and Hobday, 2013), which requires long-term accumulation of resources and 
capabilities (Lee and Lim, 2001; Park, 2012; Chen and Chen, 2015). Under such conditions, 
employing talents is critical. For example, many scholars emphasize the importance of huge 
cheap skilled manpower resource for the catch-up of India’s IT service sector (Arora et al., 
2001; Athreye, 2005; Madhani, 2008; Lee et al., 2014). Similarly, several scholars identify the 
important role of the ethnic Indian top managers in US high-tech firms in the catch-up process 
(Madhani, 2008). To comprehend the advanced technology thoroughly, a firm also needs to 
increase and conduct in-house R&D intensity (Li et al., 2010; Park, 2012). For example, 
Samsung Electronics expanded from 12,000 R&D engineers in 1997 to 27,000 in 2005, while 
its R&D spending of revenue increased from 5.86% in 2000 to 10.08% in 2005 (Hu and Hsu, 
2008). As the saying goes, “practice is the sole criterion of truth,” which is also true for 
technology learning. Therefore, learning from trial and error is common among latecomers 
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(Chuang and Hobday, 2013). 
An effective strategy for technology learning is critical for latecomers. This strategy may 
be hampered by forerunners resisting licensing or transferring technology. Effective strategies 
of technology learning may include acquiring of technology externally (Sung and Hong, 1999; 
Li and Kozhikode, 2008); seeking chance to access external knowledge or knowledge diffusion 
(Mu and Lee, 2005; Li and Kozhikode, 2008; Chen and Chen, 2015; Hu et al., 2015); obtaining 
technological support from foreign firms (Sung and Hong, 1999; Chuang and Hobday, 2013); 
cooperating with public research institutes (Mu and Lee, 2005), foreign firms, and related 
organizations (Hu et al., 2015); and fully utilizing technology spillovers from relevant 
industries and firms (Chuang and Hobday, 2013). In addition, firms can establish joint ventures, 
absorb advanced technology from foreign firms, or learn through informal learning, licensing, 
co-development, strategic alliance with foreign firms (Mu and Lee, 2005), and OEM (Chuang 
and Hobday, 2013). Innovation clusters formed through foreign inward direct investment and 
export activities (Li et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2014) may also be a source of new technologies. 
 
2.3 Business ecosystem 
 
The development of an industry is never isolated from the global value chain and environment 
as well as the local industry and environment. A business ecosystem can be actively created by 
firms themselves. For example, firms can combine international relations with local capacity 
in local systems (Chen and Chen, 2015). They will then benefit from the “network” access to 
knowledge and the source of capital. However, business ecosystems also arise with the 
breakthrough of technology and management mode. For instance, firms used to complete all 
R&D internally. However, this arrangement decreased efficiency, and only giant companies 
could afford such heavy investments. However, the modularization of technologies offers 
opportunities for latecomers. A good example is the revolution in molecular biology. The 
modularization of biopharmaceutical industry disintegrates the vertically integrated process of 
developing new drugs into different segments (Wang et al., 2012), which provide latecomers 
with additional opportunities and a friendly industry ecosystem for catch-up. 
To create a beneficial business ecosystem, latecomers usually form business organizations 
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or alliance with other firms (Li and Zhou, 2008; Lee et al., 2014). As to the potential partners, 
latecomers may ally with local firms as well as foreign firms, even with the international 
standardization work group (Park, 2012). Amsden and Hikino (1994) argued that firms joining 
a business group have many chances to obtain scarce and crucial resources like technological 
expertise and that the knowledge diffusion in business groups is faster than in individual firms. 
Guillén (2000) also hold the same opinion that business groups are superior and convenient in 
obtaining resources in contrast to individual firms. Similarly, Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
conclude that emerging economies suffer from institutional voids, and business groups can 
mitigate this problem by creating convenient access to scarce and crucial resources for the 
members. They believe that business groups create neo-institutions and act as an alternative for 
the weak institutions in emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Peng and Delios, 
2006). 
However, business groups are not purely altruistic. On the contrary, the basic rules for 
forming business groups is complementarity, reciprocity, and mutual benefit among members. 
Only firms that contributed to the network can obtain support from the network (Narula, 2006). 
In other words, the foundation to form a business group is the complementary assets from 
different firms, which may include competitive manufacturing, distribution, service, and 
complementary technologies (Teece, 1986). In fact, latecomers usually prefer to ally with firms 
that have incumbent complementary assets (Zhang et al., 2013; Chen and Chen, 2015). 
In addition, firms can also catch-up through an interactive and competitive ecosystem. 
Interactions among different stakeholders in the ecosystem can form a standardized product 
and generate a competitive environment for innovation. In the study of South Korea’s cellular 
phone ecosystem, Hu and Hsu (2008) find that South Korea’s cellular phone vendors have 
interactive cooperation with operators; by contrast, in Japan, Japanese operators have great 
control and influence over the whole industry chain, while cellular phone vendors in Europe 
and America are independent of the carriers. Although cellular phone makers must gain support 
from operators, brand cellular phone companies still have the most power in terms of product 
development, channel management, pricing, and promotion. In this way, South Korea created 
an innovative environment full of competition. As an example of a business ecosystem, in the 
Indian IT service sector, many scholars emphasize the importance of innovation clusters 
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(Dayasindhu, 2002; Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Madhani, 2008; Lee et al., 2014), such as 
Software Technology Parks. 
Industry modularization and value chain evolution also formalize business ecosystems. 
Industry modularization propels latecomers’ innovations in two ways. First, modularity enables 
local firms to break the technological barrier to technology-intensive industries. As 
technological innovations are too complicated to be imitated by latecomers (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000), the modularization of products, which separates a product into multiple modules, 
significantly reduces the difficulty of developing an individual module. Through breaking 
down the complex systems into various modules, the modularization of products allows firms 
to innovate modules rather than the whole product and create new products efficiently by 
making novel combinations of existing modules (Schilling and Steensma, 2001). In the case of 
the Shanzhai mobile phone market in China, firms have limited resources for R&D and are 
technologically inferior. The modularization in such industry reduces difficulties in R&D and 
enables firms to source available modules readily from developers. As a result, several 
advanced firms focus on developing core technologies, such as chipsets, whereas latecomers 
with good sense of local markets’ demands can focus on designing or developing other parts 
of phones (Liu et al., 2015). In doing so, Chinese firms can easily combine self-developed parts 
with outsourced parts and quickly introduce them to the market. Secondly, modularity prompts 
the evolution of the industrial value chain, which in turn speeds up the innovation process to 
respond to the highly changing market. In the conventional mobile phone industry, vertical 
integration of the value chain consumes considerable time due to in-house R&D as well as the 
coordination and development of all parts of a complex product. In facing highly changing and 
segmented markets in latecomer countries, electronic suppliers gradually turned themselves 
into module developers who form loose cooperation to produce the final products. In this way, 
they create a horizontal value chain in which certain members are responsible for developing 
chips; others are responsible for hardware design; and Shanzhai firms take charge of 
manufacturing project management. Consequently, the time required in the development of a 
new mobile phone is substantially reduced (Liu et al., 2015). Hu and Hsu (2008) also confirm 
that Samsung also benefits from the integrated value chain, wherein the key parts of cellular 




2.4 Government role 
 
Emerging economies are associated with the weakness of capital and other important resources 
for the development of the economy. Therefore, governments in emerging economies have to 
use limited resources to create output as much as possible. A typical form of which fosters 
several crucial industry sectors. The most common strategy of governments is to enact 
supportive policies, including fiscal and tax policy, to facilitate crucial industry sectors, or to 
modify the existing state policies to cope with the demands of crucial industry sectors (Wang 
et al., 2012). For instance, Choung et al. (2012) study the strong role of policy design and 
implementation by the state in influencing the ICT standard setting in South Korea. They 
suggest that technologies and standards policies should be clearly focused in the early phase, 
which allows a high level of institutional flexibility in the later phase; moreover, they find that 
the significance and role of state intervention and control alters the catch-up because the 
government can raise public interest and awareness for use of standards and provide 
commercialization support to firms and strengthen regional and international connections for 
domestic firms (Choung, Hameed, and Ji, 2012). The government also sets protective policies 
to ensure the initial growth of local firms and reduce reliance on foreign companies. In the case 
of Iran’s thermal electricity generation systems, the government announced a local content law 
that expected firms to manage the projects and generate local sources (Kiamehr et al., 2015). 
Governments also play an important role in creating a favorable environment of 
technology spillover, which is helpful for firms’ technology learning and catch-up. In emerging 
economies, the government commonly builds technology zones (Wang et al., 2012), where 
business infrastructures are complete and ample (Hu et al., 2015). These governments also 
establish institutional platform that can attract knowledge-creation players (Wang et al., 2012), 
initiate public research institutes to help local firms absorb the advanced technology (Mu and 
Lee, 2005), or negotiate with industry leaders for technology transfer. Hu and Hsu (2008) find 
that the South Korean government’s decision to cooperate with Qualcomm, the biggest CDMA 
IC design house, helped firms capture large market shares of CDMA in the world. Hu and 
Mathews (2005) argue that latecomer countries tend to rely more on public R&D expenditures 
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than on private R&D expenditures in the early stages of their industrial development. Thus, 
government support for public R&D increases innovative capabilities for latecomer countries. 
Thirdly, governments often create market demand for local firms to accumulate capital 
and capabilities. If the market is too small to support the development of an industry, then the 
government will establish utility or state-owned firms to fulfill the market vacancy (Sung and 
Hong, 1999). To face the growing demand for electricity and high costs of equipment in power 
plant projects, the Iranian government established Mapna, which aims to provide an 
inexpensive solution for public investments in power generation, support the growth of feasible 
local content, and facilitate technology transfer to local manufactures in Iran. After establishing 
Mapna, the state client awarded six projects that were aggregated into a package to Mapna 
without running competition to create appropriate conditions for technology transfer to the 
local firms (Kiamehr et al., 2015). 
The role of the government is crucial in East Asian countries and the regions’ catch-up 
process, such as the Chinese telecommunication equipment industry (Mu and Lee, 2005), the 
Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor industries (Lee and Lim, 2001; Mathews, 2002), and the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry (Guennif and Ramani, 2012). The Indian government’s 
proactive support plays an important in role IT service industry; it aids in obtaining tariff and 
tax relief or exemption, attracting foreign investors and investments, fostering educational 
institutions, constructing telecommunications infrastructures, and building techno parks (Arora 
et al., 2001; Madhani, 2008; Lee et al., 2014). According to Linsu (1997), South Korean firms 
benefit from the intellectual property regime established by the South Korean government 
because they are unconstrained to imitate the technologies from multinational firms in the 
initial stages of the catch-up process (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). 
 
2.5 Market condition 
 
The destiny of an industry is to satisfy the needs of customers. Therefore, the market condition 
determines the prospect of an industry. Market condition is depicted by market size, market 
segmentation, and market concentration. First, a large market is better than a small one. Certain 
emerging economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, heavily rely on the export market 
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because of their small domestic market (Whang and Hobday, 2011). The overreliance on 
exportation exposes emerging economies to the volatility of the international market. However, 
emerging economies with large domestic demand will enjoy superiority (Mu and Lee, 2005). 
For example, China has a large domestic market, which provides Chinese firms with innate 
advantage and breeds many great firms such as Huawei and Lenovo which accumulate 
managerial experience and narrow the technology gap with industry leaders during their 
domestic operations. Using their prior experience and capability accumulated in the domestic 
market, latecomers in China compete with industry leaders in global markets. This case is also 
true for the Shanzhai mobile phone industry in China, which was also boosted by huge Chinese 
domestic demand, especially in low-end markets (Liu et al., 2015).  
Secondly, a segmented market is good for latecomers’ survival, even when catching up 
with forerunners. In the initial stage of the catch-up process, latecomers struggle for survival 
and are inferior to forerunners. A highly-fragmented market provides latecomers with a low-
end and niche market, where latecomers earn their first pot of gold and accumulate managerial 
experience for further development. Shanzhai firms in China enjoy a large segmented market, 
which offers a low-end market to satisfy with inexpensive and sound quality mobile phones 
(Liu et al., 2015). Moreover, latecomers can avoid competing directly with multinational 
incumbents. Within a highly fragmented market, latecomers will have a chance to find many 
market spaces, which multinational incumbents often neglect but can be served with latecomers’ 
limited resources (Xie and Wu, 2003; Li and Kozhikode, 2008). As latecomers develop, the 
highly fragmented market also offers latecomers chances to challenge the market leaders in 
high-end market. Thirdly, market concentration is measured by Herfindahl, which uses firms’ 
market sales to describe industry structure. In highly concentrated industries, latecomers may 
have more resources for product innovations than forerunners, but the former may also have 
less competitive pressure for conducting innovative activities (Li et al., 2010). 
 
2.6 Technological regime 
 
The specific pattern by which an industry’s innovative activities are organized is the result of 
disparate technological regimes indicated by the essence of technology (Lee and Lim, 2001). 
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Technological regimes, such as appropriability, entry barrier, trajectory, cumulativeness, and 
technological cycle time, will influence the innovative activities of latecomers in their catch-
up process. The appropriability of technology (i.e., patents) influences R&D activities and 
technological advancement (Klevorick et al., 1995). That is, if technology appropriability is 
well protected, then latecomers would not be worried about their innovations being imitated. 
In addition, latecomers will increase their willingness to invest in R&D. Furthermore, upon 
making technology breakthroughs, latecomers can create a window of opportunity in catching 
up through claiming technology appropriability (Hu et al., 2015). Entry barrier is the result of 
technological complexity (Whang and Hobday, 2011; Hu et al., 2015) and economy of scale 
(Chen and Chen, 2015). Generally, an industry with a high entry barrier is unfavorable for 
latecomers to catch-up with the forerunners. However, if latecomers enter the industry and keep 
a foothold in the industry, then they would also enjoy the benefit derived from the entry barrier. 
In addition, if the dominating technology of an industry has a predictable technological 
trajectory or low uncertainty of the technological trajectory, latecomers can ascertain the further 
direction of technological development, enabling them to reduce the risk of R&D investments.  
Cumulativeness is measured by the frequency of innovations (Lee and Lim, 2001). If an 
industry has a low frequency of innovations, then technology change is slow. As such, 
latecomers will have additional time and chances to catch-up with forerunners. In the same 
vein, technological cycle time is closely related to cumulativeness. If technological cycle lasts 
for a long time, then latecomers would have chances to absorb and grasp the technology before 
the existing technology undergoes a breakthrough. 
 
2.7 Windows of opportunity 
 
In general, windows of opportunity are derived from entry timing and technological 
opportunity. When a brand-new technology comes out, it is a good entry moment created by 
technological opportunities for latecomers to set foot in the industry. When the paradigm shifts, 
all firms face the new technology and have a similar start. As such, entry barriers become 
relatively low. A new techno-economic paradigm provides latecomers with windows of 
opportunity to catch-up with the forerunners if latecomers adopt a new techno–economic 
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paradigm faster than the incumbent firms, which usually are reluctant to give up old 
technologies (Perez and Soete, 1988). 
In comparison with commercialized technology, the licensing of the brand-new 
technology may be obtained by latecomers more easily. A technology without enough 
commercial tests comes with great risks. Meanwhile, forerunners often lose interest in a new 
technology and rather select other commercialized technology. Therefore, latecomers can 
create new catch-up path by adopting the brand-new technology. A typical case is the South 
Korean mobile handset industry (Whang and Hobday, 2011). At first, Korea’s R&D institute, 
ETRI, looked for a partner to license the GSM technology, which was already commercialized 
in Europe. However, foreign firms resist to license GSM technology. ETRI then turned to the 
CDMA technology of Qualcomm, which is an emerging and untried technology even in the 
developed countries. Qualcomm was eager for find a party to realize CDMA’s 
commercialization. Hence, ETRI obtained not only the CDMA technology but also substantial 
favorable support from Qualcomm. Presently, telecommunication firms in South Korea are the 
forerunners in CDMA. 
Business-cycle downturns can create a window of opportunity because downturns impair 
incumbents and make resources cheaper than before. Consequently, the difficulties for 
latecomers are reduced (Mathews, 2005). 
 
3 Catch-up of Chinese firms in LED Industry 
 
The LED industry is a technology- and capital-intensive industry with a relatively long and 
modularized industry chain, including substrate, epitaxial wafer, LED die in upstream, 
encapsulation in midstream, and various LED applications in downstream. One of the core 
technologies of LED is material technology, which is still dominated by powerful international 
corporations from US, Japan, and Europe, such as Cree, Lumileds, Nichia, Toyoda Gosei, and 
Osram. However, Chinese firms yield outstanding results of catch-up in the global LED 
industry. In 2012, the Chinese LED output value reached 200 billion RMB, and 70% of the 
total output is for export; hence, China is already the manufacturing bases for global LED 
application products (Wang and Li, 2013). Chinese firms are not only catching up in the 
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production processes, such as encapsulation and applications, but they are also reaching the 
production of core chips. Chinese firms even record great technology breakthroughs in the 
production of epitaxial wafers, which requires the most advanced technology. In 2012, the 
localization rate of Chinese lighting application chips was as large as 72% (Zhao et al., 2013). 
To be specific about the catch-up process of LED firms, we collected supportive data for LED 
firms located in China. Description of the main foreign and Chinese firms in the LED industry 
chain in China are listed in Table 3. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Following Lee and Lim (2001), catch-up is divided into two types, namely, market and 
technological catch-up, which are measured in terms of market shares and technological 
capabilities, respectively. We will apply the catch-up framework introduced in the first part of 
this study to explain these two types of catch-up of the LED industry in China. We will not 
demonstrate the effect of technology capability on market catch-up as well as the effect of 
market condition on technological catch-up for the following reasons. A large degree of 
overlaps exist between the effects of technology capability on market and technological catch-
up as well as between the effects of market condition on market and technological catch-up. 
Thus, we only illustrated the effect of technology capability on technological catch-up and the 
effect of market condition on market catch-up to avoid redundancy. 
 
3.1 Market catch-up of LED industry in China 
3.1.1 Roles of the government 
Latecomers from emerging economies face shortage of capital and resources in the catch-up 
process. Governments from emerging economies play an active role in supporting domestic 
firms’ catch-up as they prioritize industry developments. Prior studies argue that the 
government can install supportive policies (like favorable fiscal policies), modify existing state 
policies, or establish an effective platform for industry development (Wang et al., 2012). During 
the catch-up of Chinese firms in the LED industry, the Chinese government also played an 
important role in realizing catch-up in the local and the global markets. This circumstance is 
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illustrated by the considerable attention and commitments of the Chinese government to 
develop the semiconductor lighting industry. In June 2003, the Chinese government took the 
lead in uniting the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Information Industry, 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the original Ministry of 
Construction, and the China National Lighting Industry Associations to establish 
semiconductor lighting engineering coordination and leading groups. In October of the same 
year, the Ministry of Science and Technology started to launch a “Semi-conductor Lighting 
Engineering Project” and committed a 35 million RMB special fund to identify solutions for 
the recent difficulties of critical technologies in the industry (Zhao et al., 2013).  
Market demand is crucial in the beginning of industry development or when a new product 
is introduced. Firms can only realize product value if the market accepts the products. Selling 
products is a premise for the follow-up development of firms. However, at the initial stage of 
industry development, latecomers lack capital and technology. The quality of product from 
latecomers is much lower than that of large competitors, and firms are at a disadvantage to 
compete with global leaders. Under this condition, the government’s role in creating market 
demand is essential for latecomers’ survival (Sung and Hong, 1999). Satisfying the original 
market demand will help latecomers increase the accumulation of capital. Latecomers can 
afford to expand the scale of production and make numerous R&D investments, a beneficial 
approach for the firm’s long-term success (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In the early years of 
Chinese firms’ catch-up in the LED industry, the Chinese government introduced numerous 
policies to stimulate domestic demand, thereby helping Chinese firms overcome the “cold start” 
stage. For example, in 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (CMST) 
formulated the “Demonstration City Plan for Semiconductor Lighting Application” called the 
“Urban LED project” covering Hangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and 18 other well-developed 
cities mainly for street lights. In 2011, the CMST planned for the second stage of the “Urban 
LED project” on a larger scale covering 50 cities. Until the end of 2012, the government applied 
7 million LED lights and saved 2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, which is a 
remarkable outcome (Zhao et al., 2013). The Chinese government then introduced new 
regulations to develop consumption behaviors of buying LED products and expand the LED 
market for local firms. In 2011, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, 
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the Chinese Commerce Department, the Chinese General Administration of Customs, the 
Chinese State Administration of Industry and Commerce, and the Chinese General 
Administration of Quality Supervision jointly issued a ban on importing and selling ordinary 
incandescent light bulb gradually. From 2016 onwards, ordinary incandescent light bulbs can 
no longer be imported and sold in China. This ban will result in a great increase of LED lighting 
demand. 
In addition to market creation, the government also tends to establish a favorable policy 
environment to help domestic firms’ catch-up (Wang et al., 2012). The Chinese government 
treats the LED industry as a strategic sector and formulated various industrial planning and 
supportive policies to foster the LED industry. For instance, the Eleventh Five-year Plan, the 
National Program for Long-and Medium-Term Scientific and Technological Development, and 
the Planning of Adjustment and Revitalization for the National Electronic Information Industry 
are explicitly stipulated to support the LED industry, including investment in technology R&D, 
construction of supporting facilities, and guidance of private capital investment and 
consumption habits. Apart from these favorable policies, the Chinese government also 
provided direct subsidies to LED firms, thereby filling the gap of LED firms’ capital shortage. 
Since 2009, many local governments introduced direct subsidy policies for buying imported 
MOCVD equipment. Typically, cities like Wuhu and Yangzhou offered 10 million RMB 
subsidies per MOCVD reactor (Fu, 2013). Under such policies implemented until 2012, the 
total number of MOCVD reactors amounted to 980 in China, for which Wuhu and Yangzhou 
accounted for 30% of the total MOCVD installed base (Fu, 2013). 
 
3.1.2 Market Condition 
 
The development of the Chinese LED industry is a result of the establishment and success of 
the domestic LED market. Generally, a huge market size means many business opportunities 
and the potential for economy of scales to achieve operation efficiency (Mu and Lee, 2005). 
As discussed, by introducing many specific and supportive LED industry policies at the initial 
stage of the LED industry, the Chinese government successfully fosters the consumption habit 
of local markets and thus created a large LED market. The increasing rate of development of 
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rural and urban areas and the enormous population of China also dramatically create a huge 
demand for LED products. 
With regard to the market segmentation of the LED market, the diversified market 
provides abundant choices for Chinese LED firms to position their products to meet various 
market demands (Mu and Lee, 2005). Considering the huge market size, even firms engaging 
in only one market segment can still make profits and develop technology. Therefore, in their 
initial development, LED firms tend to first target the low-end market or specific market 
neglected by multinational companies, and they serve markets with cheap products of modest 
quality. This method enables Chinese firms to avoid direct competition with multinational 
corporations (Xie and Wu, 2003). When firms have accumulated enough technological 
capacities, efficient operating experience, and other resources, they can easily move from 
lower-end markets to the mid and high-end ones. For instance, Elec-Tech International Co., 
Ltd. used to produce low-end chips. In 2011, the company released a high-power chip, which 
reached an international leading level; the company then entered the high-end market 
successfully (China Semiconductor Industry Association, 2011). 
Given their superior manufacturing capabilities, Chinese LED firms have a competitive 
advantage in the export market. Many countries focus on energy saving and emission reduction. 
Japan, the US, and the EU have all formulated their LED promotion plans. In 1998, Japan 
announced “the 21th century lighting plan.” In 2000, the US proposed “The Next Generation 
Lighting Initiative,” which was listed in the Energy Act. In the same year, the EU launched the 
Rainbow Project to replace conventional bulbs with LED lighting. During the rapid 
development of the international LED market, Chinese LED firms increasingly started to target 
the global LED market. China is currently the leading exporter of LED lighting products 
worldwide. 
 
3.1.3 Technological Regime 
 
As mentioned, the upstream LED industry is a technology-intensive industry. However, this 




One of the main technical features of the upstream of the LED industry is that most LED 
technology is embedded in the production equipment. Chinese LED firms can catch-up with 
market leaders without mastering core technologies. They can access advanced technologies 
by purchasing LED production equipment. For example, MOCVD is the core equipment for 
the production of LED chips. In 2014, global shipment of MOCVD machines was 228—65.79% 
of which were purchased by LED firms in Mainland China. From 2010 onwards, LED firms in 
Mainland China re the biggest customer of MOCVD machines. In 2014, MOCVD machines in 
the Chinese mainland accounted for 31% of the total number of MOCVD machines globally, 
and Chinese firms were the largest buyers. Initially, Chinese LED firms had no mastery of the 
underlying design technology, but they could still produce chips with imported MOCVD 
equipment. As Chinese LED firms gradually accumulated technological know-how, they 
started to attempt to master the deposition of MOCVD layers and develop chips. During the 
Fifteen Year Plan, the Institute of Semiconductors of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
developed a 3*2〞MOCVD reactor prototype. At the same time, Chinese firms with the Xi’an 
University of Electronic Science and Technology developed 3*2〞and 6*2〞GaN MOCVD 
reactors. Moreover, under the support of Guangdong Province, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences successfully developed the first MOCVD prototype to handle 48 wafers at a time. 
Subsequently, many Chinese firms like the Chinese Semiconductors Company and Shanghai 
Ideal Energy Company introduced their own MOCVD prototypes and started to produce 
epitaxial wafers (Wang et al., 2013). 
 
3.1.4 Business ecosystem 
 
Traditional wisdom regards business ecosystems as a combination of stakeholders related to an 
industry, including firms, universities, research institutes, government, and customers, who 
provides a resource network to its members (Chen and Chen, 2015). Firms in business 
ecosystems have many opportunities to access knowledge, technology, resources, and capital. 
In the public LED projects of China, the Chinese government tends to adopt the Energy 
Management Contracting (EMC) model and proposes many modifications of the EMC 
according to various local situations, such as Guarantee Energy Management Contracting 
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(GEMC), Government Guarantee Energy Management Contracting (G2EMC), and Property 
Energy Management Contracting (PEMC). Actually, the government links LED firms with 
guarantee companies, banks, and LED consulting agencies and forms an efficient business 
ecosystem, with the government as the coordinator. Members of this business ecosystem work 
closely with one another and promote the development of LED lighting projects. 
Business ecosystems composed of different industrial clusters enable efficient 
communication and cooperation within members. Such an arrangement is helpful for 
formatting interactive cooperation (Hu and Hsu, 2008), which contributes to reduce the costs 
and promotes cooperation in the entire industry chain, especially the cooperation for innovation 
and R&D activities. Moreover, business ecosystems facilitate the transmission of market 
information, thereby helping LED firms reduce risk. Nowadays, the LED industry in China has 
established integrated industry chains and four industrial clusters, namely, the Pearl River Delta, 
Yangtze River Delta, Northern China, and Jiangxi and Fujian Provinces. These four industrial 
clusters cover 85% of the total LED firms and over 90% of the total output value. Thus, they 
constitute a preliminary completed industry chain. The central government approved Shanghai, 
Xiamen, Dalian, and Nanchang as the first semiconductor lighting project cities. Such an 
agglomeration effect derived from the business ecosystem provides an efficient platform for 
the cooperation and communication among different parts of the LED industry chain. 
Consequently, the business ecosystem contributes to the cooperation of innovation and R&D 
activities and the localization of the supply chain. Moreover, such an ecosystem reduces 
production costs, facilitates the formulation of LED industrial standards, and promotes large-
scale production. For instance, the semiconductor lighting industry in the Pearl River Delta is 
mainly concentrated in Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Foshan, and Dongguan. It has the largest 
production scale and investment for LED encapsulation. Its significant competitive advantage 
is the co-location among firms in midstream and downstream. Guangzhou aggregates dozens 
of firms engaged in LED encapsulation and applications, whereas Shenzhen establishes an 
integrated LED industry chain from the production of sapphire (AI2O3), substrates, chips, and 
encapsulation to applications. 
Furthermore, the China Solid State Lighting Alliance (CSA) is established as a part of the 
business ecosystem and plays an important role in improving the catch-up process of Chinese 
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firms. The CSA specializes in R&D, production, and application of semiconductor and LED 
lighting. It consists of various members, such as companies, universities, research institutions, 
industry associations, and testing facilities all over the country. The CSA acts as an information 
platform to release updated information relevant to the LED industry, such as the annual report 
of the LED industry development, analysis of the government’s industrial policies, and updated 
news of LED firms’ dynamics and expertise for protecting intellectual property of Chinese 
firms. The CSA organizes several international semiconductor lighting exhibitions and 
workshops (e.g., GHINASSL and Green Lighting), establishes the Chinese semiconductor 
lighting internet site (i.e., www.china-led.net), and publishes several LED-related journals and 
the industry development yearbook to encourage communications within the industry (Li, 
2013). The CSA is responsible for setting technological specifications and delivering patent 
service. CSA members have already developed 13 technological specifications and are 
establishing a “patent pool,” which can facilitate cross-licensing and reduce the transaction 
costs of firms. In addition, the CSA contributes to organizing and executing major application 
demonstration projects, such as the “Water Cube” in the Olympics and the lighting energy-
saving reconstruction project of the Great Hall of the People. Accordingly, the CSA advances 
the applications of CSA members’ technological achievements and improves public awareness 
of semiconductor lighting technologies, thereby expanding domestic demand and encouraging 
industrial development (Li, 2013). The CSA substantially contributed to the establishment of a 
Joint Innovation State Key Laboratory of Semiconductor Lighting to address the technological 
weakness in the upper part of the industrial chain. The laboratory can integrate different 
resources from diverse sources and take advantage of diversified strengths to realize joint 
innovation and overcome technological shortcomings (Li, 2013). 
 
3.1.5 Windows of opportunity 
 
In the market catch-up process of the Chinese LED industry, LED firms mainly encounter two 
opportunities, that is, market opportunity and business-cycle downturns. 
As to market opportunity, Chinese LED firms are faced with an expanding LED market 
locally and abroad. For energy conservation and emission reduction, Japan, the US, and the EU 
 
 22 
launched various projects to promote LED lighting products since 1998, a situation which 
provides Chinese LED firms with an expanding overseas LED market. With respect to the 
domestic LED market, China also participates in the promotion of LED lighting products and 
green lighting, thereby creating a stable and expanding domestic LED market for Chinese LED 
firms. 
Certain parts of the LED industry suffer from business-cycle downturns. Such downturns 
weaken the incumbents and lead to reduced prices of critical components. In turn, such a 
circumstance creates opportunities for the entry of latecomers (Mathews, 2005). In 2011, the 
global LED industry suffered from an excess capacity of LED chips. However, that situation 
benefitted firms engaged in LED applications and motivated the popularization of LED 
products in China. Although Chinese chip firms suffered much from such excess capacity, most 
of them survived with the support of the government. The Chinese government adopts a holistic 
industrial development strategy with the goal of maximizing the interest of the entire LED 
industry rather than of a specific part of the industry. Although LED chip firms were faced with 
losses, LED application firms obtained substantial benefits, an outcome which is helpful to the 
entire LED industry in the long term. Therefore, the Chinese government supports industry 
from downstream to upstream through its holistic industrial policies and thus helps chip firms 
to de-stock their excess capacity and overcome economic downturns. 
 
3.2 Technological catch-up of China’s LED industry  
3.2.1 Roles of the government 
 
For technology-intensive industries, the government takes the lead in building R&D consortia 
to assist domestic firms in technological catching-up (Mu and Lee, 2005; Wang et al., 2012; 
Hu et al., 2015). In the initial stage of catching-up, Chinese LED firms had insufficient 
resources to research the core technologies of LED. Meanwhile, the dominant multinational 
LED companies were reluctant to transfer these core technologies to Chinese LED firms. 
Therefore, Chinese LED firms had limited access to advanced LED technology. Accordingly, 
the Chinese government established R&D consortia by combining universities and research 
laboratories with LED firms. The government could then concentrate its resources through the 
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industry–university–research cooperation. Once universities or research laboratories gained 
technological breakthroughs, these research achievements could be smoothly transferred or 
diffused to LED firms through the technological achievement transformation channel created 
by the government. In this way, the technological capability of the entire LED industry chain, 
such as the production of substrates, epitaxial wafers, and LED dies, were promoted. As early 
as 1986, the Chinese High-tech R&D Program, named ‘863 Program’ listed photoelectron 
technology as one of the four tasks of information technology. This program, under the 
collaboration between China Electronics Technology Group 48th Institute and Nanchang 
University, China produced MOCVD wafers comparable to those of international producers in 
2000 (Fan and Ruan, 2013). In 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology launched 
“The National Semiconductor Lighting Project,” a milestone in the development of high 
brightness LEDs. To develop the core technology of LED (such as the production technology 
of substrates, epitaxial wafers, and LED dies), many universities (e.g., Peking University, 
Tsinghua University, and Nanchang University) and research institutes (e.g., The Institute of 
Semiconductors of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Physics of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, and the 13th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group 
Corporation) were all actively involved in technology research. Nanchang University 
successfully gained its own intellectual property rights by producing GaN on a silicon substrate, 
and their blue light and green light LED chips are now commercialized (People’s Daily Online, 
2016). Furthermore, Chinese LED firms also spare no effort to develop LED technology. For 
example, San’an Optoelectronics Co., Ltd., Epilight Technology Co., Ltd., Elec-Tech 
International Co., Ltd., Lattice Power Co., Ltd., and Changelight Co., Ltd. made substantial 
investments in the design of chip structure and improvement of production processes; 
consequently, they obtained many achievements in increasing the performance and the 
reliability of products. In 2011, Elec-Tech International Co., Ltd. released a high-power chip, 
which reached international energy-efficiency leading levels and filled the gap for lighting 
chips made in China. The cooperation and co-development of industry, university, and research 
institutes distinctively improved the absorptive capacity of LED firms and accelerated the 




3.2.2 Technological capability 
 
The establishment of Chinese LED firms’ technological capabilities mainly occurs in two ways, 
that is, technology decomposition and recombination.  
Technology decomposition is defined as the deconstruction of a set of technologies into 
separate technical modules to learn about the structure functions and principles of each 
technical module. This method can reduce the barriers for absorbing advanced technology 
(Sung and Hong, 1999; Hu et al., 2015). In doing so, local firms can forgo the long stage of 
resource and capability accumulation, and they enter into an industry quickly (Lee and Lim, 
2001; Park, 2012; Chuang and Hobday, 2013; Chen and Chen, 2015). 
For Chinese LED firms, technology decomposition reduces the entry barrier and resource 
requirements of the LED industry. In the initial stage of the Chinese LED industry, Chinese 
LED firms relied on importing LED dies for encapsulation. In comparison with other segments 
of the LED industry chain, LED die encapsulation is more labor intensive and has a relatively 
low technological level. At that time, Chinese LED firms acted as the manufacturers of large 
multinational LED companies. In this process, Chinese LED firms decomposed the production 
technology and then imitated it to design a product. Through this kind of incremental learning, 
Chinese LED firms gradually made great breakthroughs from periphery technology to core 
technology, and they accumulated knowledge and capabilities about LED technology. At the 
end of the last century, Chinese LED firms moved toward the upstream of the LED industry 
chain and began to produce epitaxial wafers. With the help of prior accumulation of efficient 
operation, technology, and R&D capabilities, Chinese LED firms began the development of 
epitaxial wafer, which is one of the hardest parts of the LED industry chain and requires the 
most advanced technology. They also tried a small-batch production of such epitaxial wafers. 
Technology decomposition enables Chinese LED firms to maximize the technology 
capacity from related industries, universities, and research institutes. In particular, the R&D 
consortium of industry–university–research cooperation organized by the Chinese government 
becomes the main source of learning, absorbing, and decomposing advanced LED technologies. 
Meanwhile, high modularization of the LED industry chain enables LED firms to absorb the 
entire complex LED technology and reduce the cost of technology learning. Firms can thus 
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focus on a separate segment of the whole LED technology and then develop it further. 
As discussed, technology decomposition enables Chinese LED firms to accumulate 
upstream technology capacity. Through the recombination of existing technology, firms can 
then make separate technical modules into new innovations. 
Technology recombination refers to the firms’ reorganization and recombination of 
existing technologies to develop innovative ideas and new technologies. Firms will combine 
various external and internal technologies and then localize them to meet specific market 
demands. Currently, industry leaders are always reluctant to transfer or license technologies, 
especially core technologies, to latecomers. Latecomers cannot rely on a single technology 
source to acquire all technologies. Therefore, latecomers must adopt various strategies of 
technology learning and obtain technologies from different sources (Mu and Lee, 2005; Li and 
Kozhikode, 2008; Chuang and Hobday, 2013). In addition to foreign firms, the main 
technology source of Chinese LED firms involves universities and research institutes in the 
R&D consortium. In government-led LED projects, the government encourages universities 
and research institutes to industrialize their technological achievements. Thus, domestic LED 
firms can readily absorb and make full use of such advancements. Take chips technology for 
example. After Chinese LED firms possess the chips technology, they can design the structure 
and production process of chips according to local market demand to increase the performance 
and reliability of products. Moreover, latecomers could exploit their prior-accumulated know-
how for recombination. For firms with prior knowledge in another industry related to the LED 
sector, their prior technology capacity, operational experience, and social relations lay the 
foundation for technology recombination. In 2007, the Irico Group Corporation affiliated with 
the Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission invested 130 
million RMB in LED firm Epilight Technology Co., Ltd. The main business of the Irico Group 
Corporation is the plasma display panel and liquid crystal display (LCD). Investment in 
Epilight Technology Co., Ltd. expanded the main business of the Irico Group Corporation into 
the LED photoelectron field, and they realized the synergetic effects among these three 
businesses. 
----------------------------------- 




Table 4 summarizes the technology sources of Chinese LED firms. To generate the list of 
Chinese LED firms, we first reviewed all publicly listed firms in LED-related industries by 
reading the firms’ descriptions. Then, we selected firms whose main business involves LED 
technologies and products. The codes of industry we reviewed are C38, C39, C40, C41, and 
I65 in the specification of industry classification of listed companies (version 2012). Firms in 
those industries mainly engage in manufacturing electrical machinery, computers, and 
telecommunication equipment. We also supplemented the information of Chinese LED firms 
by reviewing research reports about the LED industry. Subsequently, we sent the firm list to 
experts in LED firms (including a Chinese subsidiary of a multinational enterprise and two 
Chinese firms) and asked them to identify the most influential and important Chinese LED 
firms. The experts can make selections from the firm list and nominate other firms beyond the 
firm list. Finally, we determined the firm list covering 32 publicly listed firms and 2 unlisted 
firms. These firms are the most powerful LED firms in China and can adequately represent the 
entire Chinese LED industry. We listed 34 such companies in Table 3. In Table 4, the licensees 
or transferees of technology are the 34 firms in the firm list. Patent licensing and transfer data 
were drawn from the Incopat patent database, which is a comprehensive and professional 
database covering global patent information of firms in China and other countries. To obtain 
Table 4, we searched the Incopat database using the 34 sample firms’ names as keywords and 
obtained all patents relative to sample firms. Then, we filtered the patent information and 
retained patents whose patent assignees or licensees are our sample firms. Finally, we classified 
the remaining patent information into two categories, that is, patent licensing and transfer. In 
each category, we further divided the patent according to the source. As shown in Table 4, the 
two main sources of technology for Chinese LED firms are domestic firms and research 
institutes (including universities). We cross-checked the Philips’ intellectual property, 
compared their public licensee information with our firm list and found consistent results as 
our findings. We also cross-checked these results by interviewing related companies, such as 
Philips, Crystal Optoelectronic, and Silan Microelectronic. Their responses provide possible 
explanations for our findings. First, most Chinese LED firms are located in the middle and 
downstream of the industry value chain, and the existing patents can be generated by Chinese 
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firms easily or at low or modest cost. Thus, Chinese companies may not use the patent licensing 
from leading foreign LED companies. Second, license programs like those of Philips only 
disclose companies who sell their finished products (LED based luminaires and retrofit bulbs) 
under their brand. Thus, tracing licensee information for companies who manufacture 
intermediate products is difficult. 
Moreover, although individuals have their own category, they commonly share patents 
with their work units in China. Therefore, “patents belong to an individual” can be treated as 
particular case of “patents belong to a domestic firm” and “patents belong to a university and 
research institute.” Thus, the mode of R&D consortium and the combination of “production, 
teaching, and research” has a greatly help Chinese LED firms to gradually develop their 
technological capabilities. 
 
3.2.3 Technological Regime 
 
One of the main features of the LED industry is that the technological trajectory of LED is 
explicit and predictable. In other words, the uncertainty of the technological trajectory is low, 
and latecomers can be certain of the technology development direction, which helps latecomers 
reduce the risks of R&D (Lee and Lim, 2001). In the LED upstream industry, the core 
technology is substrate technology. Substrate technology is the key to epitaxial wafer 
production. Different kind of substrates require various production technologies for epitaxial 
wafers and influence the process of chips and LED encapsulation. Therefore, the development 
of substrate technology will greatly shape the entire technological trajectory of the LED 
industry. Extant material which can be used to produce GaN substrate include aluminum oxide, 
carborundum, silicon, and zinc oxide. However, only aluminum oxide and carborundum are 
commercialized on a large-scale. Most supplies are still controlled by the most powerful LED 
firms, such as Nichia in Japan, which monopolizes most aluminum oxide substrate supply, and 
Cree in United States, which is the dominant supplier of commercial carborundum substrates. 
Substrate production remains the bottleneck of the LED industry. Therefore, according to the 





3.2.4 Business ecosystem 
 
The combination of stakeholders (with their resources) related to an industry forms a resource 
network for its members (Chen and Chen, 2015), thereby enabling market participants to 
incorporate with others. Such merging is helpful for resolving technical problems. The LED 
industry is also highly modularized, and every part of it has a mature technological trajectory. 
As such, the industry lowers the barrier for firms to further master LED technology. More 
specifically, technology modularization allows firms to deconstruct a complex product and the 
production process into several simpler modules. Producing or innovating independent parts is 
much easier than doing so for an integral and complex product (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 
Schilling and Steensma, 2001). Therefore, LED firms that achieve technology breakthroughs 
in any part of the LED industry chain will establish their competitive advantage and thus have 
a chance to catch-up with the leaders in any part of the LED industry chain. Actually, Chinese 
LED firms accomplished many technological breakthroughs in certain critical aspects of the 
LED industry chain. In March 2011, the Wuhan National Laboratory for Optoelectronics and 
the School of Energy and Power Engineering of Huazhong University of Science and 
Technology owned the intellectual property right for developing a world-leading encapsulation 
technology. In June 2011, a sapphire crystal weighing over 100 kilograms was produced in 
Jiangsu Province, a testament that Chinese LED firms greatly reduce the difficulty of 
developing GaN substrate material. In November 2011, Elec-Tech International Co., Ltd. 
released a high-power chip which reached international leading level. All these technological 
breakthroughs reveal that Chinese firms are catching up in every part of the LED industry chain 
(China Semiconductor Industry Association, 2011). In addition, many traditional lighting 
manufacturers like NVC Lighting and Sunshine Lighting are also investing in LED and are 
engaged in the transformation from conventional to LED lighting (Fu, 2013). At the same time, 
related industries in business ecosystems are also making large investments in the LED industry. 
Although applications of LED in the LCD TV industry and general lighting industry differ, the 
basic technology is similar. Thus, Many LCD TV manufacturers are actively involved in the 
LED industry. In 2010, Konka invested 22.5 million USD to Yingrui Optoelectronics 
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Technology Company. As one of the important color TV manufacturers, the Rainbow Group 
already established plants for epitaxial chips in Shanghai and Hefei. These changes 
strengthened the R&D of LED technologies and opened up the LED market. 
 
3.2.5 Windows of opportunity 
 
In the technological catch-up process of the Chinese LED industry, LED firms grasp 
technology opportunities very well. When leading multinational companies transfer the 
production of midstream and downstream of the LED industry chain to China, Chinese LED 
firms grasp the opportunity to absorb and imitate LED technologies. In the meantime, Chinese 
firms also accumulate production and operation capabilities, thereby building the management 
foundation for technological development in the long run. 
 
3.2.6 Technological performance 
 
By July 2013, Chinese LED companies and institutions already applied over 80,000 innovative 
patents and utility model patens. As the Chinese LED industry focuses on middle stream and 
downstream, these patents are primarily distributed in the application (65%) and the 
encapsulation (25%) fields (Fan and Ruan, 2013). For in-depth analysis of the technology 
performance of the leading Chinese LED firms, we used the above 34 firms which account for 
the main proportion of the Chinese LED market share and which are also positioned in different 
parts of the entire industry value chain. We then summarized the number of patent applications 
of firms to reflect the technological catch-up performance of the LED industry (See Fig. 2). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert fig. 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In 1985, the first LED patent was approved. The number of patents increased dramatically 
since 2006. More specifically, the number of innovation patents and utility model patents 
soared since 2006, while the number of design patents became stable over time.  
To describe the technological characteristics of Chinese LED firms in different parts of 
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the LED industry chain, we divided the 34 firms into four groups according to the positions of 
their main business in the LED industry chain. We also cross-checked with the experts in the 
LED domain about the differentiation of the LED value chain (Please see the detailed list in 
Table 3). The four groups include the integrated, upstream, midstream, and downstream firm 
groups. The main businesses of firms in the integrated firm group cover the entire LED industry 
chain, whereas those of the upstream, midstream, and downstream firm groups are limited to 
the upstream, midstream, and downstream of the LED industry chain, respectively. 
Figs. 3 and 4 show that the patent applications and innovation patent applications among 
the four firm groups are increasing. Fig. 5 indicates that firms in the upstream and integrated 
firm groups have a high proportion of innovation patents. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert fig. 3 about here 
Insert fig. 4 about here 
Insert fig. 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
The feature shown in Fig. 5 also appears in Fig. 6 and depicts the patent intensity of the 
four groups. Patent intensity equals the number of patents divided by the number of employees. 
As shown in Fig. 6, firms in the integrated and upstream firm groups have relatively higher 
patent intensity than firms in the midstream and downstream firm groups. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert fig. 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
We also analyzed the technological diversity of the four groups. Technological diversity 
reflects the extent to which firms can innovate in different technology areas (Rahko, 2016). 
To measure technological diversity, we first calculated the Herfindahl index of the 











where Si is the ratio of the number of patents in the i
th patent category to the total number of 
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patents in a firm, and N is the total number of patent types in the firm. As the lower value of 
the Herfindahl index (H) reflects a higher diversity of patent types, we used 1 minus H such 
that a higher value of the Herfindahl index indicates a higher diversity of patent types. To 
eliminate the effect of the number of patent types on the value of the Herfindahl index, we 











As shown in Fig. 7, the technological diversity of the four groups of firms are converging 
gradually. All firms maintain a relatively high technological diversity. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert fig. 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
4 Conclusions and discussion 
 
From latecomers to today’s important players in the global LED industry, Chinese LED 
companies achieved great success. According to a summarization of prior studies about the 
determinants of successful catch-up, we offer a general framework for systematically analyzing 
the catch-up outcome of latecomers. We then applied this framework to the Chinese LED 
industry to demonstrate our general framework. 
The general framework on what makes a successful catch-up in latecomer industries 
contributes to catch-up literature in the following ways. We identified six factors for 
determining technology and market catch-up, including technology capability, business 
ecosystem, government role, market condition, technological regime, and windows of 
opportunity. Numerous studies focused on what determines the catch-up of latecomers (Sung 
and Hong, 1999; Mu and Lee, 2005; He et al., 2006; Hu and Hsu, 2008; Whang and Hobday, 
2011; Choung et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2015; Kiamehr et al., 2015), but most 
of them still addressed specific factors in a certain industry. For example, the Indian 
government’s active support plays an important role in the Indian IT service industry (Arora et 
al., 2001; Madhani, 2008; Lee et al., 2014), whereas grasping the opportunity created by a new 
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technology (CDMA) is critical in the Korean mobile handset industry (Whang and Hobday, 
2011). However, the factors for analyzing one specific industry may not be directly applied to 
others. In addition, we still require general industry-level framework, which can integrate the 
diverse findings in prior studies. Our general framework identifies the determinants of the 
catch-up process and also demonstrates the interrelationship of the determinants. As such, our 
general framework can serve as a fundamental model to analyze the market catch-up and the 
technology catch-up across various industries. 
We also contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the catch-up in the Chinese LED 
industry. Only few studies addressed this issue, and they offered a limited understanding. For 
example, Hu et al. (2015) investigated how technological regime enables technology 
latecomers to shift the oligopolistic structure of the global LED industry. As discussed, the LED 
industry is a technology- and capital-intensive one, and the entire value chain for such an 
industry is complex. Thus, in most cases, leading firms are supposed to come from traditional 
developed countries. However, despite certain technology gaps between Chinese latecomers 
and foreign forerunners, Chinese firms have already exceeded the forerunners in terms of 
market shares. By systematically analyzing the underlying factors in determining latecomers’ 
catching up, we validate our general framework and also fill the gap in terms of comprehensive 
understanding of such a special and important industry. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In addition, we also checked the top management teams’ overseas background for our 
sample firms. As shown in Table 5, 79.29% of those firms’ top management teams have 
overseas experience. This outcome indicates that top managers with experience either in terms 
of overseas education or working experience in multinational firms or their joint venture firms 
may constitute an important knowledge spillover channel. In this way, Chinese LED firms can 
be exposed to advanced LED technologies and potential markets, which are beneficial for their 
technology and market catch-up. Moreover, examining the working experience of top 
management members reveals that many top managers have work experience in large western 
multinational lighting companies. One of the vice general managers in Elec-Tech International 
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Company served as a researcher and chief scientist in the Philips Lumileds Lighting Company. 
A vice general manager in the San'an Optoelectronics company once worked as a senior 
engineer in the Taiwan Epistar company. The director of Yankon Lighting was a project 
manager, production manager, and manufacturing manager in the Philips Lighting Company 
in Asia. Such connections imply that top managers can play an important role in transferring 
managerial and technological expertise from advanced western companies to Chinese lighting 
companies and thus facilitate the whole catch-up outcome of Chinese LED companies. Due to 
limited knowledge about how top management teams influence the catch-up process of 
latecomers in emerging countries, further research is needed to examine the detailed underlying 
mechanisms of how the between-firm mobility of top managers affects the catch-up of 
latecomer industries. 
Another interesting direction for future studies is to reveal the dynamics of learning and 
catch-up in Chinese LED industry. Although Chinese firms are successfully catching up, the 
dispersed market condition in the Chinese market may lead to inefficient use of resources. 
Given the fierce competition among LED firms, a possible trend may involve substantial 
consolidation among existing firms that will result in a high level of market concentration. 
Thus, future research can track and investigate the evolution of market concentration among 
Chinese LED firms, as well as the influence of such evolution on the future development of 
the Chinese LED industry at the firm and industry levels. 
This research also has limitations. First, this work selected 34 leading LED firms in China 
as cases. However, small LED firms make up the majority of LED firms in China and may also 
play an important role in the catch-up process of China’s LED industry. Future studies may 
investigate the role of small LED firms in the catch-up process. Second, although we built a 
generalized framework for determinants of successful catch-up, this research only used the 
Chinese LED industry as a single case to demonstrate the influences of the catch-up 
determinants. Future research can take multiple case studies in broader contexts to further 
validate this framework. Third, China, as the second largest economy in the world, presents 
unique and different characteristics from many other emerging economies. Hence, future 
studies can investigate the uniqueness of the Chinese context and its influence on the industry 
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Fig. 2. The number of patent applications in sample firms (n = 34):1985–2015 
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Fig. 3. The number of patent applications for an average firm in four firm groups 
 






Fig. 5. The ratio of innovation-type patent applications to total patent applications in four 
firm groups 
 








Table 1. Articles about reviewed in paper 






















This paper applies technological capability to explain market catching-up of Korea 
industries, which is defined as a synthesis of technological effort and existing 
knowledge base. Meanwhile, technological regimes, such as cumulativeness of 
technical advances, fluidity (predictability) of technological trajectory and the 













Review Lee et 
al. 
Indian IT service firms form efficient business ecosystem and accumulate 
excellent technology capability, which make them well prepared to make full use 
of windows of opportunity created by techno-economic paradigm shift and 



















Latecomers choose strategies of learning and innovation according to their 














Review Li et al. 
FDI and latecomers' export activities are effective channels for acquiring foreign 
knowledge, which is essential for fostering product innovation. Besides, 
increasing absorptive capacity by investing in research and development and 














Policy Mu and 
Lee 
Chinese government plays important role in the catch-up of telecommunication 
industry, who adopts the strategy of "trading market for technology" and other 
industry promotion policies for knowledge diffusion. Meanwhile, the 
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technological trajectory and a lower cumulativeness also provide 












The catch-up process of latecomers depends on the accumulation of resources and 
capabilities, as well as their interactions with industrial environments. Besides, 


















Change Park  
Government and large firms plays an important role for Korea telecommunication 
systems. Meanwhile, acquisition or utilization of major capabilities, taking an 
active part in global networking, collaboration with international standardization 
work group and emphasis on in-house research and development are critical 
















Latecomers depend on their prior knowledge base and effort to develop absorptive 
capacity of foreign technology in the early age of catch-up. And then, external 
factors including government, utility firms, other related organizations, foreign 




















Accumulation of technological capabilities and the underlying absorptive capacity 





















The success of catch-up not only depends on firms' export-oriented strategy and a 
supportive government, but also rely on the interaction between technological 
characteristics and institutional settings, including corporate organization, 


























Innovation infrastructure and institutional factors, such as high-quality manpower, 
state support, legislation, capital inputs and global network connects are critical 




















The segmentation of the value chain has provided industrializing countries with a 
window of opportunity. Besides, east Asian states establish a more effective 
institutional platform, for example, biotech parks, to attract knowledge-creation 




















Domestic users, local service suppliers, favorable government policies and strong 
producer-user links make Korea mobile handsets industry realizing successful 















Institutional elements and market conditions shape and then reshape the 













The second mover of Taiwan rely on accumulated organizational capabilities. 
However, China and Korea adopt national champion policy, which Taiwan is 















Chinese government takes a phased approach to liberalization of domestic market, 
which animates its huge domestic market. Besides, Chinese firms gradually invest 















ws   
Knowledge flow from advanced countries to catch-up follower countries 
decreases to some degree, and the dependence of the catch-up countries on their 
own intra-national knowledge generation and flow rises, which indicate catch-up 





















In automobile industry, the innovative activities of multinationals have vertical 
















Compact organizational space is helpful for technological catch-up, where firms 
form business group and maintain close proximity through active interactions, 













The development of innovation capabilities and new technologies are essential for 
catch-up. Meanwhile, special capabilities need to be developed to get support 















Semi-privatized firms with arms-length relationships to government has the most 















Innovation capability and self-developed technologies have been the key to 
leading domestic firms' catch-up with the multinational corporations. Meanwhile, 
domestic firms should focus on in-house R&D development to build their 


















In China, industrial upgrading efforts are often domestically driven, within this 
domestic market there is intense competition between both domestic and foreign 

















Modularization and the evolution of value chain significantly lower the 
technological threshold of entering the mobile phone business, promote disruptive 
innovations and accelerate latecomers' accumulation of knowledge and 











Policy He et 
al. 
An entrant can leverage complementary assets to enter along a new technological 
trajectory, and then develop appropriability. We illustrate how several mobile 
telecommunications firms (Ericsson, Nokia and Samsung) pursued this strategy to 
























Extend and modify the FP&S approach (FP&S frames as a concept of national 
innovation capacity by Furman, Porter and Stern) applying it to five “latecomer” 
countries from East Asia, none of which was included in the FP&S study. Results 
are in broad agreement with the findings of FP&S, but  some important 
differences for latecomer East Asian economies: a smaller number of national 
factors matter, and there seems to be an important  role for public R&D 


















Choung   
et al. 
This paper takes stock of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
policy design, implementations of projects and standards-settings during the 
Korean catch-up in ICT sectors and attempts at highlighting their commonalities 
during three different phases: Implementation, Participation, and Definition of 
standards. The co-evolution of two types of policies and implementations-'generic' 







standards case study 
2008 
Techno
vation Hu and 
Hsu  
The gap in R&D intensity between South Korean firm and European and 
American competitors is closed. South Korean innovative power came from three 
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from service providers, and internal and external competition. After successful 
experiences in innovating products for the domestic market, South Korean cellular 
phone makers used customized design with foreign mobile operators and their 
foreign R&D centers to localize design and make modifications to meet foreign 








r et al. 
The study shows that the firm was able to exploit its linkages with local clients, 
favorable government policies and a growing domestic demand to overcome 
barriers to entry and learn how to manufacture and design complex power 
generation systems. It highlights the insights differences between strategies of 
catch-up in the Iranian case with those of Asian electronics and complex goods in 
Latin America, and the reasons behind an imbalanced progress in accumulation of 


















ment Chuang   
This paper combines the perspectives of the external foreign sources of 
technology learning for developing countries and the internal sources of 
organizational learning and routines to examine how latecomers accumulate in-
house knowledge bases and assimilate foreign knowledge to create innovation 
capabilities, and finds that the increasing knowledge bases makes the latecomers 













and Lee   
This paper utilizes the Korea innovation survey date to analyze the impact of 
industry-university-government research institute (IUG) cooperation on firm 
performance, and finds that national R&D project turns out be most significant 



















ion Kim  
This paper applies technological capability, investment and competition strategy, 
target market and threat types and favorable external circumstances to explain 
















Hu   
This paper analyzes the influence of technological innovation capabilities of one 
forerunner, Japan, and two latecomers, Korea and Taiwan on their market 
performance, and finds that firms in Korea and Taiwan expand production by 
selecting certain technological fields, while Japanese firms strengthen the 
protection of intellectual property rights to counter the aggressive market 



















cci   
The changes in the techno-economic system are opening up new windows of 
opportunity for developing countries, and are increasing the scope for a broad 























Seong   
The catch-up and post catch-up innovation by latecomer countries and the 
innovation by advanced countries are different. When Samsung was in the period 
of catch-up, it focused on accelerating product development speed. However, 
when Samsung was in the period of post catch-up, its innovation strategy was 















ws   
Latecomers are able to exploit their late arrival to tap into advanced technologies, 
rather than having to replicate the entire previous technological trajectory. 
Meanwhile, latecomers are faced with new opportunities for linking up with 
emergent institutions and networks, which makes latecomers easier to acquire 
















In low-and medium-technology (LMT) sectors, much knowledge can be acquired 
by informal means. For example, LMT industries are able to climb the 
technological ladder through exploiting various local and global informal 







of China machine 




pment Choung  
et al. 
This paper distinguishes three archetypes of innovation activities: deepening of 
the process, architectural and radical innovations. Each route of innovation 
activities in the transition period of the emerging economies requires 
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different relationships among innovation actors to facilitate the transition from 








New science-based technologies provide windows of opportunity to less 
developed countries for catch-up. And the strategies to overcome entry barrier are 







and India multiple 









The whole process of catching up should be seen as a dynamic and re-iterative 
learning process, where the development of existing resources, the learning of new 














Asian states took a very active role, focusing on fostering indigenous 
technological and production capability in the creation of their semiconductor 






















ion Jun  
This paper identified the required capabilities for survival and growth of a 
latecomer's new technological path that are Intra-Path Integration and Inter-Path 














ional Kim  
This paper holds the opinion that the core features of the Korean model have been 
recombined in creative and unanticipated ways to meet the twin challenges of 
















Table 2: The percentages and representative arguments of each determinant in the 43 articles 
Determinants 
of catch-up 
Percentage of each 
determinant in 43 papers 
Representative arguments of each determinant 
Technology 
capability 
69.767% This paper applies technological capability to explain market catching-up of Korea industries, 
which is defined as a synthesis of technological effort and existing knowledge base. 
Business 
ecosystem 
37.209% Compact organizational space is helpful for technological catch-up, where firms form business 
group and maintain close proximity through active interactions, collaboration and resource-sharing. 
Government 
role 
46.512% Chinese government plays important role in the catch-up of telecommunication industry, who 




20.930% Institutional elements and market conditions shape and then reshape the development of high-tech 
industries in large emerging countries. 
Technological 
regime 
20.930% The technological regime of telephone switches characterized by a more predictable technological 




23.256% The segmentation of the value chain has provided industrializing countries with a window of 
opportunity. 
 
Table 3: The locations of the primal foreign firms and Chinese firms in LED industry 
  Upstream Midstream Downstream 
  Substrate Epitaxial Wafer LED Die Encapsulation Lamps Luminaries Systems 
Foreign firms 
CREE               
Toyoda Gosei               
 
 51 
Nichia               
Samsung               
Seoul Semicounductor               
Everlight               
Philips Lighting               
Philips Lumiled               
Osram               
LEDvance  (Osram spin off)               
Chinese firms 
Integrated firms 
Silan               
San'an Optoelectronics Co., Ltd.               
Elec-Tech International Co., Ltd.               
China Fangda Group Co., Ltd.               
Tsinghua Tongfang               
Lianovation               
Upstream 
Grinm Semiconductor Materials Co., Ltd.               
ZheJiang East Crystal Electronic Co.,Ltd.               
Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co., Ltd.                
Xiamen Changelight Co. Ltd.               
Midstream 
Jilin Sino-Microelectronics Co., Ltd. (JSMC)               
Foshan NationStar Optoelectronics Co.Ltd               
GoerTek Inc.               
Changjiang Elec. Tech.               
Honglitronic               
Shenzhen REFOND Optoelectronics               
 
 52 
Xiamen Guangpu Electronics Co., Ltd.
（GOPRO） 
              
Shenzhen Mason Technologies Co., Ltd               
Downstream 
Ledman Optoelectronic Co., Ltd.                
Shenzhen MR  Photoelectricity Co., Ltd               
SHENZHEN CF lighting Co.,Ltd               
Yankon Lighting               
Foshan Lighting               
CNLIGHT Co., Ltd                
Feilo Acoustics               
EVERFINE Corporation               
Kingsun               
Leyard               
Unilumin               
Shenzhen jufei optoelectronics co.,ltd.               
AOTO Electronics               
OPPLE               
Tospo lighting               
Forest Lighting               
NVC Lighting Holding Limited               
Note: The highlight area means that the focal firm engages in this business. 
 
Table 4. Technology sources of Chinese LED firms 
technology sources 
the number of technology licenses 
integrated upstream midstream downstream total 
belong to individuals 2 0 2 10 14 
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belong to domestic firms 72 1 5 58 136 
belong to university and research institute 0 0 0 0 0 
belong to foreign firms 0 0 0 0 0 
total 74 1 7 68 150 
technology sources 
the number of technology transfer 
integrated upstream midstream downstream total 
belong to individuals 14 0 10 186 210 
belong to domestic firms 477 83 27 494 1081 
belong to university and research institute 59 99 0 4 162 
belong to foreign firms 17 0 0 0 17 
total 567 182 37 684 1470 
 
Table 5 Top manage teams’ overseas background of our firm list 
Company name 
The number of 
members in top 
management team 








The number of members 
with overseas education 
and working experience 
Total number of 
members with 
overseas experience 
The percentage of 
members with 
overseas experience 
Silan 15 0 0 0 0 0 
San'an Optoelectronics 
Co., Ltd. 16 0 3 0 3 0.1875 
Elec-Tech International 
Co., Ltd.  16 0 6 2 8 0.5 
China Fangda Group 
Co., Ltd. 12 1 0 0 1 0.083333333 
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Tsinghua Tongfang 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Lianovation 19 0 1 0 1 0.052631579 
Grinm Semiconductor 
Materials Co., Ltd. 14 0 0 0 0 0 
ZheJiang East Crystal 
Electronic Co.,Ltd. 15 0 0 1 1 0.066666667 
Zhejiang Crystal-Optech 
Co., Ltd.  16 1 0 0 1 0.0625 
Xiamen Changelight Co. 
Ltd. 12 1 2 0 3 0.25 
Jilin Sino-
Microelectronics Co., 
Ltd. (JSMC) 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Foshan NationStar 
Optoelectronics Co.Ltd 20 3 0 0 3 0.15 
GoerTek Inc. 16 2 3 1 6 0.375 
Changjiang Elec. Tech.  17 0 2 0 2 0.117647059 
Honglitronic 15 1 0 0 1 0.066666667 
Shenzhen REFOND 
Optoelectronics 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen Guangpu 
Electronics Co., Ltd.
（GOPRO） 12 0 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen Mason 
Technologies Co., Ltd 13 0 1 0 1 0.076923077 
Ledman Optoelectronic 
Co., Ltd.  11 0 1 0 1 0.090909091 
Shenzhen MR  




lighting Co.,Ltd 14 0 2 0 2 0.142857143 
Yankon Lighting 21 0 1 0 1 0.047619048 
Foshan Lighting 20 3 2 0 5 0.25 
CNLIGHT Co., Ltd  4 0 0 2 2 0.5 
Feilo Acoustics 24 1 6 1 8 0.333333333 
EVERFINE Corporation 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Kingsun 13 0 3 0 3 0.230769231 
Leyard 15 0 1 0 1 0.066666667 
Unilumin 12 2 0 0 2 0.166666667 
Shenzhen jufei 
optoelectronics co.,ltd. 10 1 1 0 2 0.2 
AOTO Electronics 17 0 0 0 0 0 
OPPLE 16 0  6 0 6 0.38  
Tospo lighting 17  0 0  0  0  0 
Forest Lighting 12 0 3 0 3 0.25 
NVC Lighting Holding 
Limited 18 2 4 5 11 0.61 
 
